Design optimization of storage facilities taking into account the domino effect by Bernechea, Esteban & Arnaldos Viger, Josep
Design Optimization of Storage Facilities Taking Into Account 
the Domino Effect 
 
Paper ID# 244749  
 
Authors: Esteban Bernechea,  Josep Arnaldos 
 
Centre for Technological Risk Studies (CERTEC). Department of Chemical 
Engineering. ETSEIB. Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya.  Av. Diagonal, 647. 
08028-Barcelona (Spain). esteban.bernechea@estudiant.upc.edu 
 
Keywords:  Quantitative Risk Analysis, Domino Effect, Optimization, Storage Facilities, 
Hazardous Substances. 
Abstract 
 
Storing hazardous substances is a process that entrails high risk, and in which many 
resources are spent in the planning of safety measures; however, safety could be included 
at the initial stages of the design of this type of installations, by optimizing the number of 
tanks that are used to store the substance. The effects and consequences of major 
accidents are directly proportional to the mass of materials involved in them; therefore, if 
the mass was divided in more containing units, the consequences at the moment of an 
accident occurrence would be lesser. However, as more units are used to store a 
dangerous substance in an installation, the risk of domino effect occurrence at the 
moment of an accident also increases. The objective of this paper is to develop a 
methodology that allows finding the optimum number of units that have to be used to 
store dangerous materials, taking the possibility of domino effect occurrence into 
account. The proposed methodology is described and applied to a case study as a decision 
making tool, obtaining results that demonstrate that the design of storage installations can 
be improved from a risk point of view, by combining quantitative risk analysis and 
optimization techniques. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Storing hazardous materials is a necessary but risky process. Historical analysis [1] 
reveals that 17% of the major accidents in the chemical industry happen during the 
storage process, and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reported [2] that in 
2009, 13% of the major fire accidents that occurred in the USA happened in storage 
facilities, causing losses of $69,980,000. These numbers demonstrate that it is necessary 
to continue working on the improvement of safety in dangerous substance storage 
facilities. 
 
When a process unit suffers an accident, the effects (mechanical or thermal) this event 
can have on the surrounding equipment can trigger subsequent waves of accidents, which 
can increase the consequences of the initial event significantly; this phenomenon is 
referred to as the domino effect, and it has been formally defined as a cascade of events 
in which the consequences of previous accidents are increased both spatially and 
temporally by following ones, thus leading to a major accident [3]. A historical analysis 
[4] of 225 accidents that have involved domino effect, and that occurred after 1961, 
analyzing origin, causes, materials involved, effects, consequences and most frequent 
sequences of accident as the main factors in the study revealed that thirty five percent of 
the accidents studied occurred in storage areas, which makes these types of installations 
the most prone to suffering cascading accidents, and that eighty nine percent of the 
accidents involved flammable materials; LPG was found to be the substance involved in 
more events.  
 
The objective of this work is to propose a methodology that allows obtaining the 
optimum number of tanks to be used in the design of a facility where explosive or 
flammable materials are stored, where domino effect can take place, in order to minimize 
the risk associated to the facility; this is achieved by combining quantitative risk analysis 
and optimization techniques to calculate the risk associated to the facility, depending on 
the number of tanks used in the design, the mass and type of substance involved, the 
frequencies and possible consequences of the accidents that can occur. The methodology 
is based on the fact that the consequences of an accident are directly proportional to the 
mass of hazardous substance involved, which means that dividing the quantity of 
substance in more tanks will make the risk associated to the facility decrease; however, as 
more units are built the risk of domino effect occurring will increase. Then, an optimum 
number of units to use in the design can be found, for which the risk is minimized, taking 
into account the amount of mass involved in the accident and its consequences on 
vulnerable elements, and also the possibility that domino effect can occur, and will 
become a greater hazard as more tanks are used. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
To find the optimum design, a model that calculates risk based on the LOCs (and 
accidents that derive from them) described in the CPR 18E (Purple Book) [5] was 
designed, monetizing the consequences of the possible accidents and multiplying these 
costs by their frequencies of occurrence, to later choose the maximum risk derived from 
all the studied accidents, which will be the risk associated to the facility. Domino effect is 
studied and included in the methodology using a threshold approach: if the effects of a 
previous accident on another tank are higher than, or equal to a certain value, then this 
second unit will suffer another loss of containment event, that will lead (with a certain 
probability) to another set of accidents, and an increase in risk. 
 
2.1 Modeling the domino effect 
 
Various works have been published on the subject of effectively modeling domino effect 
by different researchers, like Khan, Abassi, Antonioni or Cozanni; samples of their work 
can be found in [6], [7], and [8]. These works have served as guidelines for the domino 
effect risk calculation model developed in this work; however, none of them could 
actually be used, as a new tool had to be developed that could be used within the 
framework of the design optimization methodology. 
 
Modeling the domino effect is very difficult because it is a phenomenon that does not 
follow a determined pattern, and that depends on many variables, several of which have 
not been studied. To accurately describe this phenomenon all the possible accidents that 
could occur (taking into account that several events could occur at the same time) have to 
be defined, as must also be their effects and consequences over the vulnerable elements 
inside and outside of the installation. 
 
Developing a methodology that follows the evolution of an accident from its start to its 
final consequences, estimating the probabilities, effects and consequences of all the 
possible occurrences in space and time would be highly taxing, this is why some 
simplifications have to be made to make possible the modeling of the domino effect in a 
quick but effective way. In this work, the domino effect is used as a way to describe how 
risk can increase or decrease for an installation when more or less equipment are used in 
the design, theorizing that an optimal number of units, for which the risk is minimum, 
must exist; to achieve this description in a satisfactory degree, the knowledge of the way 
in which the phenomenon changes in time was not totally necessary, and added a 
different level of complexity to the modeling, as the time evolution of an accident might 
depend on human response, location of the plant and the human emergency response 
teams, or the security measures of the installation, factors that would have to be studied 
and modeled; this led to the time aspect of the phenomenon being mostly omitted in the 
methodology proposed. 
 
Domino effect can be caused by the thermal and mechanical effects of an initial accident; 
the thermal effect can come as the result of a jet fire, a fireball, a flash fire or a pool fire; 
the mechanical effects can be the overpressure wave of any explosion or the projectiles 
that result from an equipment’s explosion. There are cases in which both thermal and 
mechanical effects can be present. For this work, modeling the domino effect will consist 
on defining various possible accident sequences that can occur. The first step to achieve 
modeling the phenomenon studied is to define the initial accident, which was done by 
using the LOCs presented in the CPR 18E; these were used to define which would be the 
initial types of releases that could occur, and what their frequencies would be. 
 
Table 1. LOCs used to define initial accidents 
Code Definition 
G.1 Instantaneous release of the complete inventory. 
G.2 Continuous release of the complete inventory in 10 min at a constant rate of release. 
G.3 Continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 mm. 
 
Table 2. Frequencies for initial LOCs 
Type of Unit G.1 G.2 G.3 
Pressure Vessel 5∙10-7 y-1 5∙10-7 y-1 1∙10-5 y-1 
Process Vessel 5∙10-6 y-1 5∙10-6 y-1 1∙10-4 y-1 
Reactor Vessel 5∙10-6 y-1 5∙10-6 y-1 1∙10-4 y-1 
 
Two different types of release can occur in the LOCs: instantaneous and continuous. 
Each of them has an associated event tree, which specifies the probability of different 
possible accidents; these trees can also be found in the CPR 18E or in the reference 
manual Bevi Risk Assessments [9]. This communication relates to storage facilities of 
pressurized flammable gases, and therefore, the event trees shown are the ones that relate 
to this type of substance. 
 
Figure 1: Event Tree for the Instantaneous Release of a Pressurized 
Flammable Gas 
 
 
Figure 2: Event Tree for the Continuous Release of a Pressurized Flammable 
Gas 
 
 
The event trees in figures 1 and 2 are for a source term superior to 10,000 kg for the 
instantaneous and to 100 kg/s for the continuous release. 
 
Once the initial accidents that might occur and their frequencies are determined, the next 
step to define the domino sequence is to calculate the effects these accidents will have on 
the units that are surrounding the tank that suffers the first event, to know if they suffer 
damage, and what accidents might happen as a consequence of the initial one. To define 
the way in which other equipment might be affected, the same LOCs as for the original 
accident were used, combined with threshold values that allow knowing what type of 
release occurs in the affected units; for example, if a continuous release that leads to an 
explosion occurs in a tank, and the overpressure wave that a second unit receives as a 
result from the initial accident is higher than a certain threshold value, another release, 
instantaneous or continuous, depending on the magnitude of the wave will occur on the 
second tank, which might lead to more accidents. The threshold values used for the 
model are presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Threshold values and associated accidents used in the model 
Accident Effect Threshold Consequence on Pressurized Tanks 
BLEVE Thermal Radiation (kW/m2) 
≥ 100 G.3 type release 
< 100 No consequence 
VCE Overpressure Wave (kPa) 
≥ 109 G.1 type release 
80 < ΔP ≤ 109 G.2 type release 
30 ≤ ΔP ≤ 80 G.3 type release 
ΔP < 30 No consequence 
Jet 
Jet length 
Duration of jet 
(min) 
dj ≥ d G.1 type release 
dj < d & tj ≥ 10 G.3 type release 
dj < d & tj < 10 No consequence 
Flash - - No consequence 
Pool 
Thermal Radiation 
(kW/m2) 
Pool duration (min) 
I ≥ 40 & tp ≥ 10 G.1 type release 
20 ≤ I < 40 & tp ≥ 
10 G.2 type release 
8 ≤ I < 20 & tp ≥ 10 G.3 type release 
I < 8 No consequence 
dj = jet length; d = distance between tanks; tj = duration of jet; tp = pool duration 
 
Flash fires are not considered to have significant effects or consequences on other 
equipment, because of their short duration, even though the radiation they emit might be 
high. Jet fires have been evaluated for domino potential according to their length and 
duration time; then, if a tank suffers a BLEVE, and a surrounding unit receives more than 
100 kW/m2 of thermal radiation, a second release of the complete contents, or the mass 
released in a maximum time of 30 min, of the affected unit through a 10 mm effective 
diameter hole will occur, which might result in another one of the final events shown in 
figure 2, unleashing new accidents in other equipment. Projectiles were not included in 
the calculations because there are no models that can be applied to accurately describe 
their trajectory or radius of effect. One of the vital aspects to modeling the domino effect 
is the frequency of occurrence of the accidents, which will eventually allow calculating 
the risk and stopping the sequence of events at a certain point. The domino sequences in 
this model are arranged as event trees in which the probabilities of accidents are dragged 
through every level, so that the next one will have a lower probability as more levels are 
generated. If the example given takes place, and a G.3 release occurs in a tank, resulting 
from a G.1 release in another, the event tree of the G.3 scenario will drag the probabilities 
of the initial one, and the frequency of the first release; when an accident down the 
domino sequence occurs with a probability lower than 1·10-8 it is no longer taken into 
account as a possible initiator of other accidents. 
Finally, the model in which the domino sequences are generated, only consists of two 
steps, the first one is to define the initial accidents that might occur, and the second, 
which will be repeated until all the equipment are affected, or the accidents have a 
frequency lower than 1·10-8, is to calculate how the surrounding equipment are affected 
by the previous event. 
 
To implement this methodology a program was developed in MATLAB, in which the 
installation is defined by setting the number of tanks, their coordinates and the substance 
and quantity that will be stored; the program then calculates the distance between the 
units, and starts generating domino scenarios. It will calculate the possible sequences by 
starting all the possible LOCs in each one of the units and following the accidents until 
there are no more units to be affected, or the frequency of the accidents becomes too low. 
The main advantage of programming this methodology is that it generates all the 
sequences in a short time, and allows the occurrence of multiple accidents, so the failure 
in one of the tanks might affect various tanks at the same time, or only some of them, 
depending on their positions. Then, it is obvious that an intelligent positional design, 
regarding safety distances and containing dikes for pools must be introduced every time 
the program is used, as the domino sequences, and therefore, the risk, will depend on the 
positions of the units. 
 
2.2 Risk associated to the installation 
 
The risk calculated in this methodology must take into account the frequencies and 
consequences of all the possible accidents that might occur in the domino sequences that 
are generated after each one of the initial release events take place. The risk will be 
evaluated for each of the tanks, using all the possible initial types of releases; the risk 
associated to the installation will be the sum of the maximum risks obtained for the initial 
releases. r =  � max3
G=1
�(f ∙ C): i = 1⋯ n� [Eq. 1] 
 
Where G represents each one of the possible initial LOCs, f and C are the frequencies and 
economic costs of the possible accidents and n is the number of tanks. 
 
The frequencies of accidents have already been discussed. To estimate the cost of an 
accident, its effects and consequences over humans, the environment, equipment and 
other material values have to be determined. In this paper, the following models were 
used to estimate the effects of accidents: solid flame model for effects of fire, TNT 
equivalent mass for explosion blasts and the ALOHA code for atmospheric releases of 
gases. The consequences of accidents on human life have been calculated using probit 
analysis, while the consequences on the environment have not been taken into account; 
the consequences on other equipment after an accident occurs are defined using threshold 
values, as is discussed in the previous section. Only BLEVE, explosions and flash 
accidents have effects on people, while all of the accidents, except the flash, can affect 
other equipment. 
 
The estimation of the cost of human life is a delicate subject; it has been decided to 
assign an economical value to the death or injury of a person based on the numbers 
suggested by the Spanish legislation for traffic accidents. The cost of the consequences of 
an accident on human life will be: 
 CH = 219,000 Nk + 103,000 Nik [Eq. 2] 
Where: 
Nk is the number of people that die due to the accident. 
Nik is the number of people that result injured from the accident. 
 
The economic value of a tank is estimated using a power law: CE =  85,165 �V5�0.53 [Eq. 3] 
Where: 
V (m3): volume of the tank. 
 
2.3 Design Optimization 
 
The objective function of the optimization will be the risk associated to the installation; 
the optimization consists on calculating this risk for different decisions, like using one, 
two or any possible number of tanks to store the mass, and check which one of these 
decisions represents the lower risk, while complying with an individual risk constraint; 
the design that is chosen has to have and individual risk lower than 1·10-6. The individual 
risk is calculated as the overall risk, but instead of using the product of frequency and 
cost, only the number of fatal victims caused by the accident is used. 
 Ri =  � max3
G=1
(nk: i = 1⋯n) [Eq. 4] 
 
3. Case Study 
 
The example case deals with the design of an LPG storage installation with an area of 
1,200 m2, where 50,000 kg of propane will be stored. There are three nearby areas where 
people can be affected if an accident occurs in the installation; the first one, located at a 
distance of 403 m, where 40 persons can be affected, the second one, at 430 m, where 
there are 30 people, and the third one, at a distance of 302 m, where there are another 30 
people. It is necessary to determine the optimum design of the installation. The storing 
and atmospheric conditions are presented in table 4. 
 
The program developed in MATLAB during this work was used to solve the problem, 
calculating the risk associated to the installation for different designs: from using one 
tank to store all the mass, to divide the substance in six units. In every design, safety 
measures like containment dikes were taken into account; also, the tanks were located as 
far from each other as possible. The risk results are shown in figure 3. 
 
Table 4. Case study storage and atmospheric conditions 
Temperature (K) 298.15 
Relative humidity (%) 70 
Atmospheric stability class D 
Wind velocity (m/s) 5 
Ground roughness coefficient (cm) 10 
Tank pressure (bar) 9.51 
Tank temperature (K) 298.15 
 
The minimum risk is achieved when the mass is stored in 5 tanks. The risk associated to 
the instantaneous release (G.1) decreases as more tanks are built, becoming nearly 
asymptotic at 4 tanks; the significant decline in risk for this release, from 1 to 2 and 3 
tanks is due to the fact that the consequences of the accidents become less severe as more 
units are built; however, the possibility of risk due to domino effect also increases as 
more tanks are used to store the mass, which is the reason why the curve stops decreasing 
at a certain point. 
Figure 3: Number of Tanks vs. Risk 
 
 
Figure 4 shows how the domino sequences change when using 2, 5 or 6 tanks to store the 
mass for the G.1 and G.3 releases. The circles represent tanks that suffer LOCs, while the 
diamonds represent accidents that can occur after said events. The circle from which all 
the sequence expands is the tank that suffers the initial release. The sequences showed 
represent the highest risk for the decisions. 
 
For the instantaneous release, when using 2 tanks, there are many less possible accidents 
than when 5 or 6 tanks are used, but with more significant consequences and higher 
frequencies of occurrence, which is why the risk for this type of release is higher when 
using a pair of units. Comparing the accident propagation diagrams that result from using 
5 or 6 tanks, it is noticeable that they are very similar, as also are the values of risk; when 
using 6 tanks, one more unit can suffer damage resulting from previous accidents, 
however, as more tanks are used their individual cost will decrease, this is the reason why 
the risk for this type of release remains steady when using 5 or 6 units. 
Figure 4: Domino Effect Sequences 
 
 
 
The G.2 scenario is not as relevant for the decision as the other ones, as the risk does not 
suffer significant changes no matter how many tanks are used. This type of release has a 
lower risk value than the instantaneous because the BLEVE scenario, which represents a 
grave danger to the people, does not appear as one of the accidents that can occur after 
the initial release. Also, the frequency of this type of release is very low compared to the 
G.3 type, which makes it less hazardous. The combination of low frequency of 
occurrence, and less significant consequences on the population for the possible initial 
accidents make this type of release less hazardous than the other two. 
 
The continuous release through a 10 mm hole represents, for many of the decisions, the 
second most hazardous type of discharge, due to its high frequency of occurrence (two 
orders of magnitude above the other releases frequencies) even though its effects and 
consequences are a lot less significant than those of the G.1 and G.2 discharges. As more 
tanks are built the risk decreases, except for the 6 tanks design, that has a very high risk 
value, even superior to that of the instantaneous release. This is a direct consequence of 
the domino effect; as can be seen in figure 4, for 2 and 5 tanks the G.3 scenario does not 
present domino effect, no further accidents are caused by the initial release; however, 
when 6 units are used to store the mass a domino effect occurs, as a jet originated in tank 
1 may impact tank 2, leading to an instantaneous release in this equipment, and to further 
releases and accidents in other tanks. The domino effect occurs because the distance 
between the tanks becomes smaller as more units are used, and its occurrence, coupled to 
the high initial frequency of this type of release, results in a high risk value. 
 
To reach the final decision, the individual risk analysis must be performed. As figure 5 
shows, the decisions that comply with the restriction are the use of 3, 4 or 5 tanks to store 
the propane. 
 
Figure 5: Number of Tanks vs. Individual Risk 
 
 
2.2 Including the economic investment factor in the optimization 
 
Using five tanks to store the propane would be the optimal solution from a risk point of 
view; however, in engineering projects, various factors, one of them being the economics 
of the project, have to be taken into account. 
 
It is clear that the decrease in risk between using 3 or 5 tanks is not very significant, but 
the investment made to build the facility might be. Then, a multi-objective optimization 
can be performed to find which decision optimizes both the risk and the investment. This 
second objective will be estimated as the double of the cost of the tanks. The result of this 
optimization is shown in figure 6. In this graphic, a normalization of both objectives is 
represented; the points inside the graph represent different decisions, accompanied by 
their respective number of tanks; the point in the origin of the axis is the utopian point, 
which represents the minimization of both objectives, and the decision that is more close 
to this point will be the one that minimizes both objectives. 
 
 
Figure 6: Normalized Risk vs. Investment Cost 
 
 
The closest decision to the utopian point in figure 6 is 2 tanks, but it cannot be used due 
to the individual risk restriction; therefore, the optimal solution for this problem is to use 
3 tanks to store the propane. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The results obtained in this work demonstrate that the optimum number of units used to 
store a hazardous material can be found, and that quantitative risk analysis can be paired 
with mathematical optimization to form a powerful design tool for this type of process. 
 
A new methodology that allows modeling the domino effect has been developed; it is 
simple and easy to use, and it is based on highly used concepts of risk analysis, like event 
trees. Of course, more investigation should be made regarding this phenomenon, which 
has many more dimensions than those addressed in this paper. It is a highly complex 
occurrence that can impact the design of an installation, and the risk associated to it in a 
very significant way. Another conclusion that can be gathered, is that when more 
equipment are built in less space, the risk associated to the project can increase greatly, 
not because of the more spectacular accidents like fireballs and explosions, but because 
of a small release, that can later escalate to cause more serious accidents and losses of 
containment; this occurs in the case study when the possibility to use 6 tanks inside the 
limited space of the installation is evaluated. 
 
The methodology presented helps proving the fact that performing risk analysis in the 
initial stages of a project can help saving lives and resources, and that it is necessary to 
integrate risk analysis into all the design stages of engineering projects. 
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